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COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 
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50 Rittenhouse Place 
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______________________ 
 
OPINION 
______________________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
Defendant Abdur Razzak Tai appeals his conviction 
and sentence for mail and wire fraud in connection with 
claims for payment from the Fen-Phen Settlement Trust.  Tai 
argues that the District Court committed plain error by 
implicitly shifting the burden of proof in its “willful 
blindness” jury instruction and applying upward adjustments 
under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines for abuse of a 
position of trust, use of a special skill, and aggravated role.  
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the District 
Court’s jury instruction and its upward adjustments based 
upon position of trust and special skill were not in error, but 
we will remand to enable the District Court to make the 
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required factual findings concerning whether Tai supervised a 
criminally culpable subordinate, which is necessary to award 
an aggravated role enhancement.    
 
I 
  
In the late 1990s, individuals who had taken the 
prescription diet-drug combination commonly known as Fen-
Phen began filing lawsuits against American Home Products 
Corporation (“AHP”), the predecessor of Wyeth, claiming 
that the drugs caused valvular heart disease.  In 2000, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania approved a class action settlement (the 
“Settlement”), which included the establishment of the Fen-
Phen Settlement Trust (the “Trust”), through which Wyeth 
paid compensation to class members who demonstrated that 
they sustained valvular heart damage.   
 
 Financial compensation for these heart conditions was 
determined under a pre-established matrix.
1
  To receive 
compensation, claimants were required to provide a recording 
of and a physician’s report about an echocardiogram 
(“echo”)2 and a document referred to as a “Green Form”3 
                                              
 
1
 The amount of a claimant’s benefits was determined 
by several factors, including the length of time the claimant 
used Fen-Phen, the severity of the claimant’s valvular heart 
condition, and the claimant’s age.   
2
 Typically, a technician performed and video recorded 
the echoes, and a qualified physician reviewed the video and 
the technician’s worksheet setting forth the measurements.   
 
3
 The Green Form provided the formulae for 
determining if the claimant had a condition that qualified for 
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signed by a board-certified cardiologist or cardiothoracic 
surgeon with Level 2 training in echocardiography.
4
  The 
Trust then reviewed the submissions and, when appropriate, 
tendered payment.   
 
 A representative of the Trust explained that the Trust 
relied on the integrity of the physicians signing the reports 
and Green Forms to ensure that the claimants actually had 
heart conditions that were covered by the Settlement.  Both 
the Trust and Wyeth had “audit rights,” which allowed them 
to have highly trained, board-certified physicians review the 
materials submitted to ensure “the tape . . . matche[d] with the 
rest of the substantiation.”  App. 87.  Under the original terms 
of the Settlement, only 15% of all claims could be audited.  In 
November 2002, the District Court ordered that 100% of the 
claims would be subject to audit because of concerns about 
the bona fides of the claims being submitted.
5
 
 
                                                                                                     
compensation.  Part II of the Green Form required the 
physician to sign beneath a warning that explained that it was 
an official court document and the physician was declaring, 
under penalty of perjury, that the information on the form was 
correct.    
 
4
 Level 2 training reflects a high degree of experience 
reading and interpreting echoes.  
 
5
 On March 15, 2005, the District Court approved an 
amendment to the Settlement (the “Seventh Amendment”), 
under which Wyeth agreed to create a new supplemental fund 
with a separate, faster process for reviewing and paying 
claims for which there was documentation that on its face 
qualified the claimant for Matrix Benefits.  The Seventh 
Amendment claims were all subject to medical review.  
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 Attorneys who represented certain Fen-Phen claimants 
retained Tai, a board-certified and Level 2-qualified 
cardiologist, to read echoes and prepare reports to submit to 
the Trust.  Tai estimated that he read 12,000 echoes for this 
purpose, and asserted that he was owed over $2 million 
dollars for the services he provided.  This amount was based 
upon a fee for each echo read and a bonus payment for each 
approved payment.
6
  Most of the Green Forms Tai signed 
were submitted before the 100% audit rule was imposed.   
 
 Tai acknowledged to law enforcement that in about 
10% of the cases, he dictated physician’s reports consistent 
with the findings in the technicians’ reports despite knowing 
that the measurements were wrong.  He also admitted that he 
had his technician and office manager, Debbie Patrick, review 
about 1,000 of the echoes because he did not have the time to 
do the work himself.  Patrick testified, via deposition, that she 
reviewed “a couple hundred” echoes, App. 605, and provided 
Tai with her notes to “help him out” with the volume of 
echoes he was asked to review.  App. 589-90.  Patrick 
testified that she did not know whether Tai read the echoes 
himself before signing the physician’s report and Green 
Form, but she “would assume that he did because there were 
several times that [she] even asked him” if he agreed with her 
conclusions and he sometimes told her she was wrong.  App. 
591-92.  For one particular lawyer representing Fen-Phen 
claimants, Tai signed more than 1,400 Green Forms, and of 
the 1,173 of those Green Forms that were audited or 
reviewed, only 109 were approved.  A government expert 
                                              
6
 For example, one attorney agreed to pay Tai a $100-
150 fee for each echo read, plus an additional “expert fee” of 
$900-1000 for each Green Form that the Trust approved. 
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reviewed a nonrandom sample of the forms Tai submitted for 
this attorney and found that, in a substantial number of the 
cases, the measurements were not only clearly incorrect, but 
were actually inconsistent with a human adult heart.
7
   
 
  Tai was charged in a thirteen-count indictment for 
mail and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 
1343, respectively.  The jury found Tai guilty of all charges, 
and he was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 72 months’ 
imprisonment
8
 and three years’ supervised release, and 
ordered to pay restitution of $4,579,663, a fine of $15,000, 
and a special assessment of $1,300.  Tai appeals.    
                                              
7 Tai testified that he agreed with these conclusions but 
claimed that the signature on the physician reports attributed 
to him was not his.  Tai’s employees, however, testified that it 
was his signature, and, in fact, his office administrator 
testified that she had stamped Tai’s signature on the reports 
with his permission.  
 
8
 The base offense level was 7, 18 levels were added 
under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J) (loss was more than $2.5M 
but less than $7M), 2 levels were added under U.S.S.G. § 
3B1.3 (defendant used a special skill or abused his position of 
trust), and 2 levels were added under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) 
(defendant was an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor).  
This resulted in an offense level of 29, with an applicable 
advisory Guidelines range of 87-108 months.  The District 
Court then granted a two-level variance following 
consideration of the Section 3553(a) factors due to Tai’s age 
and health, and lowered the offense level from 29 to 27, with 
an applicable Guidelines range of 70-87 months.  The Court 
sentenced Tai near the bottom of that range to 72 months’ 
imprisonment. 
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II
9
 
 
 The parties agree that none of the issues Tai presents 
were preserved for appeal and that plain error review 
applies.
10
  United States v. Couch, 291 F.3d 251, 252-53 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (stating that where no objection to the Guidelines 
calculation was preserved at sentencing, it is reviewed for 
plain error); United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 265 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (reviewing a jury instruction for plain error where 
the challenge on appeal was not raised at trial); Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 30(d),  52(b).  The defendant bears the burden to establish 
plain error.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 
(1993).  For reversible plain error to exist, there must be (1) 
an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; 
and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.  Johnson v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997).   
                                              
 
9
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231, and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
10
At argument, the Government for the first time 
argued that Tai waived his right to appeal the role 
enhancement because he withdrew his objection to its 
imposition before sentencing.  While we recognize that 
withdrawing an objection constitutes a waiver of the right to 
appellate review in most instances, we will not foreclose 
appellate review in this case, where the Government did not 
rely on waiver in its brief and enforcing the waiver rule here 
would not serve “the interests of justice.”  United States v. 
Barrow, 118 F.3d 482, 491 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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III 
 
A. Jury Instruction 
 
 We will first address whether the District Court 
committed plain error by employing the language of the Third 
Circuit’s model jury instruction when instructing the jury 
about willful blindness.  Tai argues that the model jury 
instruction is constitutionally infirm because it shifts the 
burden of proof to the defendant to disprove intent.   
 
 A willful blindness instruction is typically delivered in 
the context of explaining how the Government may sustain its 
burden to prove that a defendant acted knowingly in 
committing a charged offense.  Here, the willful blindness 
instruction was delivered after the District Court explained 
the elements common to mail and wire fraud, including that 
the Government must prove that Tai “acted knowingly with 
respect to an element of the offenses.”  Supp. App. 824.  The 
District Court defined “knowingly” as meaning “that the 
Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
was conscious and aware of the nature of his actions and of 
the surrounding facts and circumstances as specified in the 
definition of the offenses charged.”  Id.  The District Court 
then instructed the jury as follows: 
 
 As I just explained, members of the jury, 
to find Dr. Tai guilty of mail fraud or wire 
fraud, you must find that the Government 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Dr. Tai 
knowingly devised or wil[l]fully participated in 
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a scheme to defraud, and that he acted with 
intent to defraud. 
 Both of these elements involve the 
question of whether Dr. Tai had knowledge of 
an inaccuracy of the echocardiogram reports 
and green form[s] that he signed. 
 When, as in this case, knowledge of a 
particular fact or circumstance is an essential 
part of the offense charged, the Government 
may prove that Dr. Tai knew of the fact or 
circumstance if the evidence proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Dr. Tai deliberately 
closed his eyes to what would otherwise have 
been obvious to him.  
 No one can avoid responsibility for a 
crime by deliberately ignoring what is obvious; 
thus, you may find that Dr. Tai knew about the 
falsity of the echo reports and green forms 
based on evidence which proves that, one, Dr. 
Tai himself actually subjectively believed that 
there -- there was a high probability that the 
reports or forms were not accurate, and, two, 
Dr. Tai consciously took deliberate actions to 
avoid learning about the existence of the falsity. 
 You may not find Dr. Tai knew that the 
reports or forms were not accurate if you find 
that the defendant actually believed that the 
reports and forms were accurate. Also, you 
may not find that Dr. Tai knew the reports and 
forms were not accurate if you -- you find only 
that Dr. Tai consciously disregard [sic] a risk 
that the reports and the forms were not 
accurate or that Dr. Tai should have known 
10 
 
that the reports and forms were not accurate, 
or that a reasonable person will have known 
of a high probability that the reports and 
forms were not accurate.  
 It is not enough that Dr. Tai may have 
been reckless or stupid or foolish or may have 
acted out of accident. You must find that Dr. 
Tai himself actually subjectively believed that 
there was a high probability that the reports and 
forms were not accurate, consciously took 
deliberate actions to avoid learning about their 
inaccuracy and did not actually believe that they 
were accurate.  
 
Supp. App. 828-30 (emphasis added).  Tai argues that the 
emphasized phrases in the fifth paragraph told the jury that 
certain innocent states of mind preclude a finding of 
knowledge, and he asserts that this suggests to the jury that it 
can find that Tai did not meet the element of knowledge only 
if the jury finds those innocent states of mind to have existed.  
This in turn, Tai argues, impermissibly shifts the burden from 
the government to Tai to disprove his knowledge.   
 
 There is no doubt that a jury instruction violates due 
process if it fails to place squarely on the Government the full 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the required 
mental state for the offense.  See Patterson v. New York, 432 
U.S. 197, 204-07 (1977).   The language of the fifth 
paragraph, however, did not impose any burden, implicit or 
explicit, on Tai to prove or disprove his knowledge.  Rather, 
the willful blindness jury instruction as a whole came after 
the jury was told the Government bears the burden to prove 
that Tai acted knowingly and with an intent to defraud.  The 
11 
 
willful blindness instruction then explicitly explained that 
“the Government may prove” this element through evidence 
that established beyond a reasonable doubt that Tai 
“deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have 
been obvious to him.”  Supp. App. 829.  The instruction then 
explained to the jury what this meant and how it could not 
find him guilty if the jury found that Tai actually believed the 
forms were accurate, that he disregarded a risk of inaccuracy, 
or that he or a reasonable person should have known the 
reports were inaccurate.  The instruction then reiterated that, 
to convict, the jury must find Tai subjectively believed there 
was a high probability the reports were inaccurate and he 
consciously took steps to avoid learning about their 
inaccuracy.  These instructions told the jury when willful 
blindness does or does not exist, but did not imply in any way 
that Tai must present evidence concerning his own beliefs or 
knowledge.  Thus, there was no implicit or explicit shifting of 
the burden of proof to Tai.
11
   
 
                                              
 
11
 Courts have approved similar instructions.  United 
States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that 
a willful blindness instruction saying that “[i]f the [evidence] 
shows you that [the defendant] actually believed . . .” 
reflected the “correct burden of proof”);  see also United 
States v. Clay, 618 F.3d 946, 952 & n.5 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(approving the following in a willful blindness instruction: 
“You may not find [defendant] acted ‘knowingly’ if you find 
he was merely negligent, careless, or mistaken . . . .  You may 
not find that [defendant] acted knowingly if you find that he 
actually believed . . .” and finding no merit to the argument 
that this instruction shifted the burden of proof). 
12 
 
 Moreover, the District Court told the jury that it could 
not find knowledge based on a willful blindness theory unless 
the Government proved Tai’s knowledge beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and in fact the jury was expressly told at the beginning 
of the instructions that Tai never had to prove anything, and 
that the burden always remained on the government.
12
  This 
was “more than sufficient to dispel any possible 
misconception that [Tai] bore a burden to prove that he was 
not willfully blind.”  United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 
159 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that even when the district court 
had misspoken and erroneously shifted the burden of proof in 
its willful blindness instruction, repeated references to the 
government’s burden and the district court’s general 
instruction that the burden does not shift ensured that there 
was no plain error).
  
When the instructions are read as a 
whole, it is clear that no jury could conclude that Tai bore the 
burden of proof as to any aspect of his knowledge and the 
District Court committed no error in connection with its 
willful blindness instruction. 
 
                                              
 
12
 The District Court instructed that 
 
[t]he presumption of innocence means that the 
defendant has no burden or obligation to present 
any evidence at all or to prove that he is not 
guilty.  The burden or obligation of proof is on 
the Government to prove that the defendant is 
guilty, and this burden stays with the 
Government throughout the entire trial.  
 
Supp. App. 818-19. 
13 
 
B. Sentence 
 
1. Abuse of a Position of Trust or use of a Special Skill 
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 
 
 Tai argues that the District Court plainly erred by 
imposing a two-level increase under U.S.S.G § 3B1.3 for 
abuse of a position of trust and use of a special skill.  Section 
3B1.3 allows an increase of two offense levels “[i]f the 
defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used 
a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the 
commission or concealment of the offense.”  Because either 
an abuse of a position of trust or use of a special skill supports 
the two-level enhancement the District Court applied, Tai 
must establish plain error with respect to both to avoid it.  We 
will examine each separately. 
 
a. Abuse of Position of Trust 
 
 To receive an enhancement for abusing a position of 
trust, the facts must show that the defendant took “criminal 
advantage of a trust relationship between himself and his 
victim.”  United States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d 1110, 1112 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  Courts consider the following three factors to 
determine whether a position of trust or a trust relationship 
exists: “(1) whether the position allows the defendant to 
commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the degree of authority 
which the position vests in defendant vis-a-vis the object of 
the wrongful act; and (3) whether there has been reliance on 
the integrity of the person occupying the position.”13  United 
                                              
13
 Tai argues that the position of trust guideline applies 
only to those who were selected or paid for by the entity with 
14 
 
States v. Dullum, 560 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Once a position of trust has been 
found, § 3B1.3 requires a finding that the defendant “abused 
that position in a way that significantly facilitated his crime.”  
United States v. Sherman, 160 F.3d 967, 969 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
As to the first factor, Tai’s position as a cardiologist 
with Level 2 training in echocardiology allowed him to 
commit a difficult-to-detect wrong.  Only an equally well-
trained physician was permitted to support claims for 
payment and only one with access to the same patient 
information would be able to detect Tai’s fraud.  Indeed, it 
would be impossible to verify the accuracy of his reports 
                                                                                                     
whom the trust relationship is said to exist.  He provides no 
support for this position and, indeed, our precedent makes 
clear that this is not a requirement. See United States v. 
Sherman, 160 F.3d at 967, 970 (3d. Cir. 1998) (holding that a 
doctor was in position of trust with insurance company who 
insured his patients).  At argument, Tai tried to distinguish 
Sherman on the grounds that insurance companies approve 
providers under a health insurance plan and are therefore in a 
pre-existing trust relationship with those providers.  Our 
analysis in Sherman, however, did not make this distinction, 
as we did not focus on whether the insurance company had 
pre-approved the doctor, but instead concentrated on the fact 
that “the insurance company relied on the integrity of 
Sherman as a doctor holding a medical license.”  Id.  Like the 
insurance company in Sherman, the Trust accepted Tai’s 
representations because of his expertise. 
15 
 
without a second and similarly qualified doctor reviewing the 
same information.
14
   
 
As to the second factor, Tai had a large degree of 
authority over the submission of the claims as he was one of 
the physicians authorized to read echoes and sign Green 
Forms for submission to the Trust.  Moreover, his license and 
experience allowed him to do so without supervision.   
 
As to the third factor, the very nature of the Settlement 
and structure of the Trust required reliance on the integrity of 
the doctors who were signing the physician reports and Green 
Forms.  To verify the existence of qualifying heart damage, 
the Trust depended upon the fact that licensed and board-
certified cardiologists or cardiothoracic surgeons with Level 2 
training in echocardiography had reviewed the claimants’ 
echoes and had prepared and signed reports attesting to the 
findings under penalty of perjury.   See United States v. Liss, 
265 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Of the other circuits 
that have addressed whether a physician occupies a position 
of trust in relation to Medicare, or a private insurance carrier, 
                                              
 
14
 Tai relies on United States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550 
(3d Cir. 2012), in which this Court held that the “difficult to 
detect” factor of the position of trust analysis had not been 
proven when defendants had failed to pay taxes that they had 
withheld from employees’ paychecks and placed into a trust 
fund account the IRS required defendants to maintain.  Id. at 
555, 567-68.  The defendants in DeMuro, however, did not 
exercise any professional judgment in their actions vis-a-vis 
the IRS trust fund on which the IRS relied, and thus that 
situation is very different from the one here.   
 
16 
 
all have answered that question in the affirmative.”).  It was 
reasonable for the Trust to have relied upon Tai’s 
representations both based on his training and the fact that to 
have a second doctor “shadow him” would be an 
unreasonable expense.  Sherman, 160 F.3d at 970.   
 
Finally, Tai’s credentials, and the deference he was 
accorded as a result of them, placed him in a position that 
facilitated his criminal conduct.  His signature gave claimants 
the opportunity to receive, collectively, hundreds of millions 
of dollars in compensation, yielding more than $2 million in 
potential payments to him.    
 
The Trust’s ability to audit claims does not mean that 
the Trust limited the authority the doctors were given to 
submit claims and the expectation that they would have done 
so honestly.   See Sherman, 160 F.3d at 970.  Rather, the 
Trust depended almost exclusively on the professional 
integrity of the physicians who submitted reports and signed 
Green Forms under penalty of perjury, particularly during the 
period Tai submitted most of the claims.  Many of Tai’s 
reports were signed and completed when the Trust and Wyeth 
were entitled to audit up to only 15% of the claims.  
Moreover, the audit looked only at whether any reasonable 
physician could have reached the conclusion of the certifying 
cardiologist that the claimant had the heart condition depicted 
in the echocardiogram tape, and thus the audit was geared 
toward accepting the medical judgments of the highly trained 
physicians who rendered them.  Cf. Sherman, 160 F.3d at 970 
(upholding abuse of trust adjustment for a physician who 
occupied a position of trust with the insurance company to 
which he submitted inflated bills and rejecting defendant’s 
argument that his authority to act was narrowed by insurance 
17 
 
company oversight via regular audits of bills submitted to 
them). 
 
For these reasons, the District Court did not plainly err 
in finding Tai abused a position of trust and enhancing his 
sentence under § 3B1.3. 
 
b. Use of Special Skill 
 
 Although the abuse of a position of trust alone is 
sufficient to justify the two-level enhancement under § 3B1.3, 
we will also examine whether it was plain error to find that 
Tai also used a special skill.  The following two factors must 
be present to support the application of an upward Guidelines 
adjustment for use of a special skill: “(1) the defendant 
possesses a special skill; and (2) the defendant used it to 
significantly facilitate the commission or concealment of the 
offense.”  United States v. Batista De La Cruz, 460 F.3d 466, 
468 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
 Tai admits that he possessed a special skill as a highly 
trained doctor but argues instead that he does not meet the 
second prong of the test because he did not use his special 
skill to commit his crimes as he refrained from exercising his 
skill when he did not review the echoes and simply signed the 
reports.   
 
 Here, Tai’s skill and credentials were the means by 
which he could participate in the claims process.  Without 
them, he would not have been permitted to submit reports to 
support claims and collect a fee.  Moreover, without his 
training, Tai would have lacked the skill to review the videos 
of the echoes, would have been unable to determine whether 
18 
 
the technicians’ conclusions were correct or incorrect, and 
would have been unable to decide whether a particular case 
was one that was wrong but that he would “let . . . go.”  Supp. 
App. 645-46; see United States v. Lewis, 156 F.3d 656, 659 
(6th Cir. 1998) (“Unlike simply billing for a procedure that 
has not been performed, exaggerating the nature of a medical 
procedure does require the use of special medical 
knowledge.”).  Thus, Tai’s special skill was integral to his 
commission of his crimes and the District Court did not err in 
finding Tai used a special skill to commit his crime. 
 
 
 
2. Aggravated Role under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) 15 
 
 Lastly, Tai argues that his two-level leadership 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) was unwarranted.  
Section 3B1.1 allows for a two-level enhancement if the 
defendant was “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor 
in any criminal activity” with fewer than five participants.   A 
participant is defined as “a person who is criminally 
                                              
 
15
 If the enhancement under § 3B1.3 had been based 
only on the use of a special skill, the role enhancement would 
not apply.  See U.S.S.G § 3B1.3 (“[I]f this adjustment is 
based solely on the use of a special skill, it may not be 
employed in addition to an adjustment under § 3B1.1 
(Aggravating Role).” (emphasis added)); Hickman, 991 F.2d 
at 1112 & n.5 (accord, but noting that the basis for this 
distinction is unclear and the connection “between . . . 
supervising others and using a special skill [is] elusive”).  
Because we conclude that the enhancement is applicable 
based upon both the abuse of a position of trust and use of a 
special skill, it is appropriate to consider the application of a 
role enhancement. 
19 
 
responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not 
have been convicted. A person who is not criminally 
responsible for the commission of the offense (e.g., an 
undercover law enforcement officer) is not a participant.”  
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1.  To be deemed “a participant 
under the Guidelines,” the “individual must be criminally 
responsible, i.e., s/he must have committed all of the elements 
of a statutory crime with the requisite mens rea.”  United 
States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 934-35 (3d Cir. 1992).   
Thus, to apply the enhancement, “the government must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the [alleged 
participants] were criminally responsible participants.”  Id. at 
935. 
 
 Tai initially objected to the inclusion of this 
enhancement.  After receiving the Government’s sentencing 
memorandum, Tai sent a letter to the District Court 
withdrawing the objection.  As a result, the Government 
presented no additional evidence concerning this 
enhancement at sentencing and the District Court made no 
factual findings concerning its applicability other than to say: 
 
An additional two levels were added pursuant to 
the guideline section 3B1.1(c) because he was 
an organizer, leader, a manager or supervisor in 
criminal activity[,] based on his employment of 
a non-physician technologi[st] whom he 
directed to read echocardiograms and then 
prepared and signed a physician’s 
echocardiogram report falsely implying or 
asserting the conclusions were the result of his 
own observations and conclusions.  
 
20 
 
App. 672-73 (emphasis added).   Absent from this recitation 
is any statement about whether the “technologist” had the 
requisite state of mind to be deemed criminally responsible.  
Furthermore, to the extent the District Court incorporated by 
reference the explanation in the PSI concerning the role 
adjustment, the PSI also lacked facts from which to conclude 
that the technologist acted with the requisite mens rea.
 16
  
Under our precedent, the culpable participation of the person 
being supervised is central to the applicability of an upward 
                                              
 
16
 The PSI, which the District Court adopted, stated the 
following as the basis for applying the § 3B1.1 adjustment:   
 
Adjustments for Role in the Offense: The 
defendant employed a technologist in his office, 
identified as D.P., who was qualified to conduct 
echocardiograms, but who was not a physician, 
and did not have Level II training in 
echocardiography.  In order to save his own 
time, and in abrogation of his obligation to 
exercise independent medical judgment, the 
defendant directed D.P. to read 
echocardiograms that had been submitted by . . . 
attorneys who represented persons who claimed 
to have been injured as a result of having 
ingested Fen-Phen, and then prepared and 
signed physician’s echocardiogram reports that 
falsely implied or asserted that his conclusions 
were the result of his own observations and 
conclusions.  Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), 
two levels are added.  
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adjustment for role.  The question here then is whether the 
absence of such a finding of criminal culpability of a 
participant constitutes plain error.  We conclude that it does. 
 
 First, the error was plain, as Badaracco has been the 
law of this Circuit since 1992, and to sentence Tai based on 
his role supervising a technologist in the absence of any 
finding about that person’s culpability is contrary to 
established law.   
 
 Second, the error affects Tai’s substantial rights, as it 
affects the length of his sentence.  United States v. Pollen, 
978 F.2d 78, 90 (3d Cir. 1992).  Here, the two-level 
enhancement for an aggravated role raised Tai’s advisory 
Guidelines offense level from 27 to 29, with an advisory 
range of 87-108 months.  The District Court varied downward 
by two offense levels from that range because of Tai’s age 
and health, and imposed a term at the low end of the 70-87 
month range of 72 months’ imprisonment.  If the offense 
level had not been enhanced for an aggravated role, then the 
Guidelines offense level would have been calculated at 27, 
and if the District Court had applied the same variance, it 
would therefore have lowered the offense level to 25, with an 
applicable range of 57 to 71 months.   If the District Court 
had again chosen to sentence near the bottom of that range, 
then the sentence could have been less than five years, which 
is a year shorter than the sentence he received.  
  
 Finally, we exercise our discretion to correct the error 
because it increased the sentence without the necessary fact 
finding and thereby affected the integrity of the proceedings.  
United States v. Saferstein, 673 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(concluding that a higher sentencing range  “too seriously 
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affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings to be left uncorrected” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  We are unwilling to speculate about the facts on 
which it was based, particularly in a situation like this, where 
the decision may have been based on a credibility 
determination or where there may be facts beyond the trial 
record that may have been considered had Tai not withdrawn 
his objection to the role enhancement.  Thus, we express no 
view as to the applicability of the enhancement but rather, to 
ensure the integrity of the proceedings, we will remand for 
resentencing to allow the District Court to make factual 
findings concerning the culpability of the individuals with 
whom Tai worked and impose the enhancement if it finds at 
least one of these participants was criminally culpable.  
Pollen, 978 F.2d at 90.   
 
III 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction and vacate and remand the judgment of 
sentence to address the applicability of the role enhancement. 
